Wednesday, March 02, 2005
"The psyche is divided and therefore political." Rae Armantrout, from this interview, which I hadn't seen. Obvious, but not in the tradition I'm trained in, so, helpful to be reminded.
~~~
But, an hour or two later:
"We have only just begun the argument for the conclusion that the life of rational agency -- the life held up as an ideal by the most prominent moral philosophers of our day -- is a life you won't be able to stand, and that there is a vastly preferable alternative. [...] But if a certain amount of disunity of agency is the precondition for and consequence of sustaining interest, and forestalling boredom, and if one can do no better than to identify oneself with the peering and curious part of the soul, then we should expect, rather, to turn up transcendental arguments for various sorts of disunified agency."
-- Elijah Millgram, "On Being Bored Out of Your Mind," Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 2004
(Translation: Very analytic venue, though Millgram is coming from an odd place, citing Bordieu against The Critique of Judgment. The view of mind put forward is explicitly anti-Aristotelian.)
What implications would this have for Bernard Williams' "integrity objection" to consequentialism?
~~~
Great ringtone piece, Sasha; I kind of get it now. Of course, I also forget to charge my phone.
~~~
But, an hour or two later:
"We have only just begun the argument for the conclusion that the life of rational agency -- the life held up as an ideal by the most prominent moral philosophers of our day -- is a life you won't be able to stand, and that there is a vastly preferable alternative. [...] But if a certain amount of disunity of agency is the precondition for and consequence of sustaining interest, and forestalling boredom, and if one can do no better than to identify oneself with the peering and curious part of the soul, then we should expect, rather, to turn up transcendental arguments for various sorts of disunified agency."
-- Elijah Millgram, "On Being Bored Out of Your Mind," Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 2004
(Translation: Very analytic venue, though Millgram is coming from an odd place, citing Bordieu against The Critique of Judgment. The view of mind put forward is explicitly anti-Aristotelian.)
What implications would this have for Bernard Williams' "integrity objection" to consequentialism?
~~~
Great ringtone piece, Sasha; I kind of get it now. Of course, I also forget to charge my phone.
